Tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus, quia non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet; sed tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata et sperata.
Sorrow is to anger as its beginning, while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger, because the angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance.
Delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam.
Pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.
Sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae quaedam contra tristitiam; et ideo quanto per delectationem contra maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur: sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow; and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it: as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink.
Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante, cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam.
Now it is clear from what has been said (q47 a1, a3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy.
Philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod "ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit".
The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trans. Alexander Pope]).