Thursday, August 12, 2010

1a 2ae q47 a1: Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? Yes.

Motivum irae alicuius semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum quia, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi.

The motive of a man's anger is always something done against him because, as stated above (q46 a6), anger is the desire to hurt another under the formal aspect of just vengeance.

Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum.

Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance; nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, si enim putemus talem esse odimus".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him to be such and such".

Irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturae.

If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.

Id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.

When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.

Ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri: quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur.

We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul, but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, insofar as he harms himself or another: which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.