Obiectum irae est bonum quia appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta ad iustitiam pertineat.
The object of anger is a good because the desire for revenge is a desire for something good, since revenge belongs to justice.
Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod "ira appetit vindictam".
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge".
Praeterea, ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est bonum. Ergo et irae.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is a good. Therefore a good is also the object of anger.
Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur; tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.
The movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a definite good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the formal aspect of evil.
Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects, whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it.
Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum: vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali: vult enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti.
The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the formal aspect of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him.
Sed ira respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus.
Whereas anger regards one object under the formal aspect of good, viz. the revenge which it seeks, and another object under the formal aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.