Potest ira dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum causatur, quia effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo in actu.
Anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions, because an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.
Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species, but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.
Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iratus habet spem puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem".
The movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible."
Unde si fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de anima.
Consequently, if the person who inflicted the injury excels by very much, anger does not ensue, but only pain, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).