Odium est multo deterius et gravius quam ira quia odium est per applicationem mali ad malum, ira autem per applicationem boni ad malum.
Hatred is far worse and graver than anger because hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil.
Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur; sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in ulciscendo.
Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, has a lesser aspect of evil than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto; nam sicut odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem irascitur.
The species and formal aspect of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in subject as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.
Sed non eadem ratione: sed odiens appetit malum inimici, inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum est vindicativum.
But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, inasmuch as it is evil; whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not inasmuch as it is evil but insofar as it has a certain aspect of good, that is, insofar as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "iratus, si fiant multa, miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
Odium autem provenit ex permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione animi propter laesionem illatam; sed odium procedit ex aliqua dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et nocivum id quod odit.
Hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, according to which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him.
Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "odium est magis insanabile quam ira".
Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."