1a 2ae q56 a1: Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Yes.

Virtus est in potentia animae quia perfectio est in eo cuius est perfectio.

Virtue is in a power of the soul because perfection is in that which it perfects.

Omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.

All operation proceeds from the soul through a power.

Disponit ad optimum: optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem.

Virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.

Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.

Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

1a 2ae q56: The subject of virtue

1. Is the subject of virtue a power of the soul?
2. Can one virtue be in several powers?
3. Can the intellect be the subject of virtue?
4. Can the irascible and concupiscible faculties be the subject of virtue?
5. Can the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?
6. Can the will be the subject of virtue?

1a 2ae q55 a4: Whether virtue is suitably defined? Yes.

"Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur," quia contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.

"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.

Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.

This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.

Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.

For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.

Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.

Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."

Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."

Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.

That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.

Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.

Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.

Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.

But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".

Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".

Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.

Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.

Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

1a 2ae q55 a3: Whether human virtue is a good habit? Yes.

Virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus, quia virtus importat perfectionem potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest.

Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.

Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".

Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".

Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".

And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".

1a 2ae q55 a2: Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Yes.

De ratione virtutis humanae est quod sit habitus operativus quia virtus humana, de qua loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem ad esse, sed magis ad agere.

It is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit because human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.

Potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu.

Power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act.

Modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.

Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, insofar as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside.

Virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.

Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man, but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

Cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.

As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q3 a2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

1a 2ae q55 a1: Whether human virtue is a habit? Yes.

Virtutes humanae habitus sunt quia potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum.

Human virtues are habits because power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.

Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus.

But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits.

Quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur.

Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.

1a 2ae q55: The virtues, as to their essence

1. Is human virtue a habit?
2. Is it an operative habit?
3. Is it a good habit?
4. The definition of virtue

1a 2ae q54 a4: Whether one habit is made up of many habits? No.

Si consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem, sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat, quia non unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.

If we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein; but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed from several habits, even though it extend to many things, because a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.

Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.

In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, inasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.

1a 2ae q54 a3: Whether habits are divided into good and bad? Yes.

Distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, quia habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae.

A good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit because a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.

Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.

Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.

Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.

Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.

1a 2ae q54 a2: Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? Yes.

Habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta quia habitus importat ordinem ad aliquid; omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur.

Habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects because habits imply order to something; and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained.

In distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.

In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.

1a 2ae q54 a1: Whether many habits can be in one power? Yes.

Contingit unius potentiae esse habitus plures quia subiectum habitus est potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est; potentia enim activa tantum non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet.

There may be several habits in one power because the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (q51 a2); for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (q51 a2).

1a 2ae q54: The distinction of habits

1. Can many habits be in one power?
2. Are habits distinguished by their objects?
3. Are habits divided into good and bad?
4. May one habit be made up of many habits?

1a 2ae q53 a3: Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act? Yes.

Hoc modo cessatio ab actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel diminuentes habitum, quia habitus per se corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente; unde quorumcumque habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem: huiusmodi habitus diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam cessationem ab actu, ut patet et in scientia et in virtute.

The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.

Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.

When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.

Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.

The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.

Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.

The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."

1a 2ae q53 a2: Whether a habit can diminish? Yes.

Habitus diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, quia sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur.

Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.

Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.

A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.

Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.

A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.

1a 2ae q53 a1: Whether a habit can be corrupted? Yes.

Per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.

A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.

Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.

As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.

Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.

Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.

Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.

But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.

Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.

In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.

1a 2ae q53: How habits are corrupted or diminished

1. Can a habit be corrupted?
2. Can it be diminished?
3. How are habits corrupted or diminished?

1a 2ae q52 a3: Whether every act increases its habit? No.

Non omnis actus habitum auget quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet: sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus.

It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.

Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).

Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).

Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.

If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.

"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.

"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).

Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.

But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.

1a 2ae q52 a2: Whether habits increase by addition? No.

Augmentum habituum non fiat per additionem quia augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam, sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam.

The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.

1a 2ae q52 a1: Whether habits increase? Yes.

Dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari quia habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid (ut dicitur in VII Physic.).

In two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions because we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17).

Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit.

First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things.

Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem.

Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: insofar as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they, in their formal aspect, imply indivisibility.

1a 2ae q52: The increase of habits

1. Do habits increase?
2. Do they increase by addition?
3. Does each act increase the habit?

1a 2ae q51 a4: Whether any habits are infused in man by God? Yes.

Aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est.

Some habits are infused by God into man, because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (q5 a5).

Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus.

And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari, ita etiam quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita perfecte.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in S.T. I, 105, 6. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

Hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit.

That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do, but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which befits nature.

Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.

Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a certain habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

1a 2ae q51 a3: Whether a habit can be caused by one act? No.

Habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum actum, quia habitus per actum generatur inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo; ad hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod activum totaliter vincat passivum.

A habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act, because a habit is generated by act inasmuch as a passive power is moved by some active principle; but in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive.

Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias.

Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances.

Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos.

Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.

In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [See I, 79, 2 ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination.

Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem.

With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned.

Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia, dicit quod meditatio confirmat memoriam. Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis statim inducit sanitatem.

But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "una hirundo ver non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una dies, nec paucum tempus".

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy."

Sed "beatitudo est operatio secundum habitum perfectae virtutis", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

But "happiness is the activity of a habit of perfect excellence" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).

1a 2ae q51 a2: Whether any habit is caused by acts? Yes.

Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis, quia actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam.

A certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts, because the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition.

Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis.

Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents, not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent.

Idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in VIII Physic. probatur.

The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.

Unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.

Wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.

1a 2ae q51 a1: Whether any habit is from nature? Yes.

Intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis, quia ex ipsa natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est in ceteris.

The understanding of first principles is called a natural habit, because it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part, and in like manner with regard to other such principles.

Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu.

Yet what is a whole, and what is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

Sed habitus qui est dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale principium.

The habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (q50 a2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle.

Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo dictum est.

Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in S.T. I, 55, 2; I, 84, 3.

Sicut in Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod esset similitudo et actus omnium.

With regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things.

Unde oportet quod superaddantur potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt.

Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand.

Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est naturalis secundum naturam speciei.

If we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature.

Sed quia talis dispositio quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio.

But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.

In VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita.

In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature, wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

1a 2ae q51: The cause of habits, as to their formation

1. Is any habit from nature?
2. Is any habit caused by acts?
3. Can any habit be caused by one act?
4. Are habits infused in man by God?

1a 2ae q50 a6: Whether there are habits in the angels? Yes.

Quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus, sed inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri, quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei).

Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, but as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them, because, though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone).

Quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, ideo inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.

As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.

In Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.

In angels there are no essential parts, but there are potential parts, insofar as their intellect is perfected by several species, and insofar as their will has a relation to several things.

Sed quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, quod "habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus, sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa".

Since the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, habits do not have one and the same aspect on both sides. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial species which [the angel] contains in itself."

Circa huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu.

The angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to a habit of this sort. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.

Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam; non autem sicut actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius potentiae: et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior.

But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.

Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam; sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere: ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suae substantiae (ut dicitur in Lib. de causis), et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior.

And therefore, as we said above (in S.T. I, 55, 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation; but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things: at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance (as stated in De Causis), and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

Sed quia nullus Angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "deiform", that is to say, that by them they are conformed to the likeness of God.

Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint immateriales.

But those habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in angels, since they are not material.

Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum".

Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the angels are of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the deiformity of their habits".

1a 2ae q50 a5: Whether any habit is in the will? Yes.

Oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum, quia voluntas, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari.

In the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act because, since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act.

Necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus.

It is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum; cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est.

Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (q6 a4; q22 a2).

1a 2ae q50 a4: Whether there is any habit in the intellect? Yes.

Ipse intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat, quia intelligere et considerare est proprius actus intellectus.

The possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider, because to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect.

Potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.

As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.

Vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.

Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the possible intellect.

Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animae et corpori.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except by the aspect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself, and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body.

Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum habituum intellectualium.

And therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many, and this belongs, above all, to the possible intellect. Wherefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

1a 2ae q50 a3: Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts? Yes.

Vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus, quia secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.

The sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them, because insofar as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus.

The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them.

Appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis.

The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.

Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod "consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum", quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis.

And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.

1a 2ae q50 a2: Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence? No.

Si accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus.

If we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: because the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body.

Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur.

But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (q110 a4).

Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.

If we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (q49 a4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.

Essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.

The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.

Philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.

1a 2ae q50 a1: Whether there is a habit in the body? Yes.

Supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a naturali qualitate corporis, aut est ab anima movente corpus.

As we have said above (q49 a2 seqq.), habit is a certain disposition of a subject existing in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore insofar as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body, or from the soul moving the body.

Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa.

Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit, because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (q49 a4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required.

Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus, similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero possunt esse secundario: inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae.

As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts, like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, insofar as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt.

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the formal aspect of habit perfectly, because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.

Philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.

The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.

1a 2ae q50: The subject of habits

1. Is there a habit in the body?
2. Is the soul a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?
3. Can there be a habit in the powers of the sensitive part?
4. Is there a habit in the intellect?
5. Is there a habit in the will?
6. Is there a habit in separate substances?

1a 2ae q49 a4: Whether habits are necessary? Yes.

Necessarium fuit habitus esse, quia habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic, sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat rationem finis.

It is necessary that there should be habits, because habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17), and perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing, since it has the formal aspect of purpose.

Sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur.

As we have said above (q49 a2, a3), habit implies a disposition in ordination to a thing's nature, and [a disposition] to its operation or purpose, [and], according to [this disposition], something is well- or ill-disposed to that [operative purpose].

Non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad bonum.

The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (q54 a3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that potentials be determined to the good.

1a 2ae q49 a3: Whether habit implies order to an act? Yes.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod "habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est", et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod "habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit", quia inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum.

Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary", and the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will", because insofar as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies ordination to act.

Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit.

In regard to the formal aspect of habit, it befits every habit to have ordination to an act. For it is formally aspectual to habit to imply some some state of affairs in ordination to a thing's nature, insofar as it is befitting or ill-befitting thereto.

Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem.

But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation.

Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem.

Wherefore habit implies ordination not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.

Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem.

Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well- or ill-disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is in ordination to the end.

Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei.

But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally ordination to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a state of affairs with respect to the thing's nature.

Si igitur natura rei, in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus, qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.

If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very ordination to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies ordination to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the formal aspect of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit, which is subjected in a power, implies principally ordination to an act.

Habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de anima.

Habit is an act, insofar as it is a quality, and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.

Non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia, ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.

It is not the formal aspect of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.

1a 2ae q49 a2: Whether habit is a distinct species of quality? Yes.

Philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum, quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re.

The Philosopher in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality, because nature is the first object of consideration in anything.

In prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

In the first species we consider both evil and good; and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult, inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement.

Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est "dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male".

And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"

Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.

And in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions".

Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni; quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.

For when the mode is befitting to the thing's nature, it has the formal aspect of good; and when it is ill-befitting, it has the formal aspect of evil.

Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio".

The Philosopher says in the Book of the Categories (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition".

1a 2ae q49 a1: Whether habit is a quality? Yes.

Habitus est qualitas quia si sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est.

We must say that habit is a quality because if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit."

Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis".

The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) that "a habit is a quality which is difficult to change".

Sed habere communiter sumpto est commune ad multa genera.

But "to have" in the general sense is common to many categories.

De habitu, secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, est quoddam praedicamentum.

A habit, in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver and that which is had, is a category.

Hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.

This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.

Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various categories. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-categories," so called because they result from the various categories; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like.

Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.

Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend.

Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod "habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti", sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus.

And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves.

Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod "inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius".

And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the category of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."

Dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem.

Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species."

In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.

"In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Categories, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the category "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.