Oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum, quia voluntas, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari.
In the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act because, since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act.
Necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus.
It is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
Sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum; cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est.
Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (q6 a4; q22 a2).