Wednesday, October 06, 2010

1a 2ae q53 a1: Whether a habit can be corrupted? Yes.

Per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.

A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.

Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.

As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.

Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.

Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.

Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.

But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.

Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.

In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.