Quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus, sed inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri, quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei).
Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, but as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them, because, though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone).
Quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, ideo inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.
As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.
In Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.
In angels there are no essential parts, but there are potential parts, insofar as their intellect is perfected by several species, and insofar as their will has a relation to several things.
Sed quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, quod "habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus, sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa".
Since the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, habits do not have one and the same aspect on both sides. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial species which [the angel] contains in itself."
Circa huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu.
The angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to a habit of this sort. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.
Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam; non autem sicut actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius potentiae: et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior.
But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.
Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam; sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere: ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suae substantiae (ut dicitur in Lib. de causis), et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior.
And therefore, as we said above (in S.T. I, 55, 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation; but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things: at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance (as stated in De Causis), and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
Sed quia nullus Angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "deiform", that is to say, that by them they are conformed to the likeness of God.
Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint immateriales.
But those habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in angels, since they are not material.
Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum".
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the angels are of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the deiformity of their habits".