Thursday, September 09, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a3: Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts? Yes.

Vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus, quia secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.

The sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them, because insofar as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus.

The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them.

Appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis.

The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.

Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod "consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum", quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis.

And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.