Si accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus.
If we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: because the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body.
Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur.
But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (q110 a4).
Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.
If we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (q49 a4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.
Essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.
The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.
Philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animae.
The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.