Amor quilibet est virtus unitiva quia amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia.
Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.
Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).
Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.
Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.
Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.
In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.
Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".
Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.