Spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens.
Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.
Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).
And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).
Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.
The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.
Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.