Nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem, quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo; omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris.
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.
Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.
Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.