Passiones sunt in anima, quia pati prout importat receptionem solam, non est necessarium quod sit materiae, sed potest esse cuiuscumque existentis in potentia.
There are passions in the soul, because passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality.
Anima autem, etsi non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid potentialitatis, secundum quam convenit sibi recipere et pati, secundum quod intelligere pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is fitting for it to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Pati et moveri, etsi non conveniat animae per se, convenit tamen ei per accidens (ut in I de anima dicitur): inquantum scilicet compositum patitur; per se autem convenit composito, quod est corruptibile.
Although it is not fitting for the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it is incidentally fitting for it (as stated in De Anima i, 3): i.e., insofar, to wit, as the "composite" is passive; the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.