Obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio.
The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.
Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.
Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.