Hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur quia
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.
These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.
Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.
Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.
Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.
Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.