Sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae quia passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae.
In the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another because passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects.
Amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec tamen contrariantur ad invicem; quin potius unum est causa alterius.
Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other.
In concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur.
In the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.
Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali.
In the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of evil.
Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio.
Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike."
Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia.
Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."
In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio.
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair."
Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia.
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring."
Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae.
But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it no longer has the formal aspect of something arduous, as stated above (q23 a3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."