Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis, quia bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit rationem laudis vel culpae (in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et culpa).
A human action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy through being good or evil because good or evil, only in voluntary actions, has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing).
Sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti: nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus.
Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action.
Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus.
Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions.
Philosophus dicit, quod "laudabilia sunt virtutum opera; vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria".
The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame."
In moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus", quarum prudentia est directiva.
In moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse."
Ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae. Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem.
Formal aspect stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, formal aspect is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by aspectual apprehension. Whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. And a particular end is subordinate to the general end.