Bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum, quia actus humani habent speciem a fine.
Good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of action because human actions derive their species from the end (q1 a3).
Aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus: scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et actus exterior; et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum.
Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (q1 a1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action: viz. (1) the interior action of the will, and (2) the external action; and each of these actions has its object.
Finis autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est, ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio obiecto.
The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will, while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears, so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.
Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis, neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action, because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments, nor do external actions have a formal aspect of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary.
Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur".
Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief".
Quando multi actus, specie differentes, ordinantur ad unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum actuum, sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris.
When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions, but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
Ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale.
Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act as the formal is to the material.