Tuesday, March 16, 2010

1a 2ae q19 a8: Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention? No.

Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et actus, secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra dictis patet.

If we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will, because the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (q12 a4; q18 a6).

Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa, possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus, materialiter loquendo: puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est intense velle medicinam.

And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.

Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit dignum illo bono.

Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the formal aspect thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, insofar as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.