Voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse mala, quia si ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala.
The will can be evil when it abides by erring aspectual apprehension because if aspectual apprehension or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know: then such an error of aspectual apprehension or conscience does not excuse the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension or conscience, from being evil.
Si autem sit error qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius circumstantiae absque omni negligentia: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti non sit mala.
But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary: then that error of aspectual apprehension or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension, from being evil.
Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti est mala (eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam scire tenetur). Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit eam cognoscere, excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala (quia error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et involuntarium causat).
For instance, if erring aspectual apprehension tells a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension is evil (since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know). But if a man's aspectual apprehension, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil (because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary).
Sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus". Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur quod utroque modo sit bonum.
As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good is caused by the entire cause, but evil from each particular defect". Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
Sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget, ita ista quaestio eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.
Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds", so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses".