Sunt aliqui actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes quia contingit quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis; sicut levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum, et huiusmodi: et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt indifferentes.
Some actions are indifferent according to their species because it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of formal aspect; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
Actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio.
Every action takes its species from its object; while the human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object as related to the principle of human actions, which is the formal aspect.
Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem; sicut dare eleemosynam indigenti.
Wherefore if the object of an action includes something befitting the order of the formal aspect, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want.
Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem; sicut furari, quod est tollere aliena.
On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of the formal aspect, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to take things belonging to another.
Omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, saltem naturalem; non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem.
Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it; but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the formal aspect.