Contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus, quia malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans, et secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus.
It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil, because evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to the right aspect, and in this sense every individual action is either good or bad.
Actus moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto (a quo habet speciem), sed etiam ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia), sicut aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.
A moral action, as stated above (a3), derives its goodness not only from its object (whence it takes its species), but also from the circumstances (which are its accidents, as it were), just as something belongs to a man according to his individual accidents, which does not belong to him according to the formal aspect of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end.
Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni.
For, since it belongs to aspect to direct, if an action that proceeds from deliberate aspect be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to the aspect, and has the formal aspect of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with the aspect, wherefore it has the formal aspect of good.
Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum.
Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate aspect, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione (sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet manum aut pedem), talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus (cum hoc habeat actus a ratione). Et sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate aspect, but from some act of the imagination (as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot), such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human (since this depends on the formal aspect). Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.