Unus actus non potest esse bonus et malus quia si accipiatur unus actus prout est in genere moris, impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali; si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest esse bonus et malus.
The same action cannot be both good and evil because if we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil; whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.
Actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris, inquantum habent rationem voluntarii. Et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter, et potest ex una parte inesse bonum, et ex alia malum.
Action and passion belong to the moral order, insofar as they have the formal aspect of being voluntary. And therefore insofar as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.