Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subiecta rationi quia bonitas voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet, et obiectum voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem.
The goodness of the will depends on its being subject to the formal aspect because the goodness of the will depends properly on the object, and the will's object is proposed to it through the formal aspect.
Bonum sub ratione boni (idest appetibilis) per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem.
The good, considered under the formal aspect of being good (i.e., as desirable), pertains to the will before pertaining to aspectual apprehension.
Sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.
But considered under the formal aspect of being true, it pertains to aspectual apprehension before pertaining to the will under the aspect of being desirable [in its goodness], because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended in [the truth of] its formal aspect.
In his autem quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per rationem.
In regard to the means, the correctness of aspectual apprehension depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end. Nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, which [correctness of apprehension] occurs through [the apprehension of] the formal aspect.
Voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem: ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum est.
The will moves aspectual apprehension in one way; the formal aspect moves the will in another: viz., on the part of the object, as stated above (q9 a1).
Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei. Bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit, appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare, quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.
For the good understood is the proportionate object of the will. But a good apprehended by sense, or a good apprehended in perception, is proportionate, not to the will, but to the sensory appetite, because the will is able to tend to the universal good that the formal aspect apprehends, whereas the sensory appetite tends only to a particular good that is apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the apprehension of the formal aspect in the same way as [the goodness of the will] depends on the object.