Sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti, quia sicut res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto, sicut et motus ex termino.
Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from the befitting object, because just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term.
Bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem.
The good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of subsisting or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of subsisting seems to be that which gives a thing its species.
Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis.
Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term.
Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.
Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the formal aspect of its goodness.