Ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum, sed etiam quia secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit.
The higher mode of aspectual apprehension is said to consent not only because it always moves to act according to eternal aspectual principles, but also because it fails to dissent according to eternal aspectual principles.
Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare, quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem.
Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension to judge of all, since it is by the aspectual principle that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human aspectual principles we judge according to Divine aspectual principles, which is the function of the higher aspectual apprehension.
Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae.
Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine aspectual principles, no judgment of aspect can be considered to have the formal aspect of a final decision.
Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur.
Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, but in that sense in which aspectual apprehension includes the will.
Consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut ad ipsam pertinet cogitare.
Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension, just as to the lower aspect it belongs to think.
Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.
Nevertheless the higher mode of aspectual apprehension exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action, and in like manner on the delight that results.
Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic pertinet ad inferiorem rationem.
But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension.
Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem ordinatur; unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica (seu principalis) vocatur.
For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained; hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the architectonic (or principal) art.