Thursday, February 11, 2010

1a 2ae q15 a3: Whether consent is directed to the end? No.

Applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est consensus, quia appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii.

The application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent properly speaking, because the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.

Sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus; ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.

Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.

Consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem agibilium.

Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.

Primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem.

Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means.

Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem.

Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo.

Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it.

Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.

But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.