Wednesday, February 17, 2010

1a 2ae q17 a1: Whether command is an act of the reason? Yes.

Imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu voluntatis, quia radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio.

Command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing, however, an act of the will because the root of liberty is the will, as the subject thereof; but formal aspect is as its cause.

Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.

For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because aspectual apprehension can have various conceptions of the good. Hence philosophers define free choice as that which is "a free judgment, arising from formal aspect" implying that aspectual apprehension is the cause of liberty.

Hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis.

The very fact that formal aspect moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.

Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.

Consequently it follows that command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing an act of the will, in the power of which formal aspect, by its command, moves to the execution of the act.