Monday, February 22, 2010

1a 2ae q17 a6: Whether the act of the reason is commanded? Yes.

Actus rationis possunt esse imperati quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur (sicut ordinat de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo).

Formally aspectual acts can be commanded because aspectual apprehension is turned back on itself (just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act).

Ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud tendit.

Aspectual apprehension commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (q9 a3), that is to say, insofar as each power is turned back on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.

Sed attendendum est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter.

But we must take note that a formally aspectual act may be considered in two ways.

Uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari potest (sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione utatur).

(1) First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, a formally aspectual act can always be commanded (as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason).

Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus rationis attenduntur.

(2) Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two formally aspectual acts have to be noticed.

Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra; hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra, nec imperari potest.

(2a) One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power; because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the formally aspectual act is not in our power, and cannot be commanded.

Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra; sed in ordine naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet.

(2b) The other formally aspectual act is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the intellect apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like; assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command.

Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum, quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam; et in talibus assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit.

(1) But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.