Est aliqua actio hominis mala quia omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate; inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate; et sic dicitur mala.
Some actions of man are evil because every action has goodness, insofar as it has be-ing; whereas it is lacking in goodness, insofar as it is lacking in something that is required by the fullness of subsisting that would befit human action; and thus it is said to be evil.
Malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum.
Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu, unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat cespitando.
Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se, secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.
An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and beingness that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of the formal aspect [of the fullness of being and goodness].
De bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa.
We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has be-ing: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the I, q5, aa1,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Be-ing in a certain unity, and simply, whereas every other thing has the fullness of subsisting that would befit its essence in a certain multiplicity.
Unde in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam. Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus; unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate.
Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have be-ing in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of subsisting due to them. Thus the fullness of human be-ing requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his be-ing. So that as much as he has of be-ing, so much has he of goodness.