Solum animal rationale et consentit et utitur, quia applicare aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet.
None but a relationally aspectual animal consents and uses, because only he who has choice of a thing can apply something to something else, and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something to something else, which pertains to aspectual apprehension.
Frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.
To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible, whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use, because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else.
Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis, absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.
But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use, because to direct one thing to another is an apprehension of formal aspect, whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.
Animals by means of their body parts do something from the anatomical imperatives of their biological heritage, not through knowing the relation of their body parts to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their body parts to what must be enacted, nor do they use them.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "uti aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but the animal who shares in aspectual apprehension can make use of a thing."