Sunday, January 02, 2011

1a 2ae q56 a2: Whether one virtue can be in several powers? No.

Una virtus non potest esse in pluribus potentiis animae quia idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas rationes, et diverso ordine.

One virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul because one act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree, but only according to different formal aspects, and in various degrees.

Diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur.

Diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof; and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not vice versa.

Una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis: secundum quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.

One virtue can belong to several powers; so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition: insofar as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.

Scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.

"To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to the correct assessment of formal aspect (i.e., essence). But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.

Prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium.

Prudence is really subjected to formal aspect, but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will.