Habitus intellectuales speculativi sunt virtutes quia habitus speculativus habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus operativus.
The habits of the speculative intellect are virtues because the speculative habit is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
Cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, ut supra dictum est: uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus.
Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (q55 a3), a habit, as we have already observed (q56 a3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (q55 a3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul, since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.
Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam, possunt quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus); non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu.
Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part, they may indeed be called virtues insofar as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect); yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit.
Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam; sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus.
For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge; but that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits.
Et secundum hoc etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod "contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa".
And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these [speculative] habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "the contemplative life has greater merit than the active life".
Virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est Deus, quod est summum speculabile.
Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, insofar as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation.
Alio modo dicitur virtus esse aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.
Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (q3 a7).