Wednesday, January 12, 2011

1a 2ae q57 a6: Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? Yes.

Convenienter adiungantur prudentiae eubulia, synesis et gnome, quia eubulia est habitus quo bene consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic, synesis est bene iudicativa, et sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum.

Euboulia, synesis, and gnome are fittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence because "euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9), "synesis" enables us to judge well, and just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel ("gnome").

Iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia: quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis.

Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment, because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.

Unde et in speculativis, una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus; scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis.

Thus even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects.

Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur: nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis, sicut plenius infra patebit.

"Synesis" and "gnome" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while "gnome" bases its judgment on the natural formal aspect, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II q51 a4).

In omnibus potentiis ordinatis, illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere.

Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command.

Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus; non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur.

The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.