Virtutes non esse impassibilitates quia passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.
Virtue is not freedom from passion because when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason; but when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.
Circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae.
The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be directed to the mean.
Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.
Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, "eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt"; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum.
These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," insofar as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati.
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately, as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, insofar as they are subordinate to reason.
Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.
Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus", scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, "non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."