Thursday, February 05, 2009

Q76 A4: Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?

No. It is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul because of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man.

Impossibile est quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima intellectiva quia unius rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis.

The substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Nam esse substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.

Et ideo dicendum est, secundum philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti; puta formam lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.

We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

In materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, sicut esse, vivere, sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.

Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum.

The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.

Anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota.

Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that in that of which the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included.

Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis tantum, sed "actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis," et quod talis potentia "non abiicit animam." Unde manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima includitur.

The soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not reject"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.

Et similiter dicitur quod anima est "actus corporis" etc., quia per animam et est corpus, et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis enim potentia "est non abiiciens," idest non excludens, animam.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such."

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale.

Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively.

Et ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply.

Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi.

For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being -- for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort -- maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4.

Et propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod ens actu -- puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi -- dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed "omne fieri statuerunt alterari," ut dicitur in I Physic.

Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form.

Si igitur ita esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis.

If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (Q76, A1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

Sed si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam inveniatur in homine.