Saturday, February 28, 2009

Q79 A7: Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

No. Memory in the intellectual part is not a power distinct from the intellect because intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Memoria partis intellectivae non est alia potentia ab intellectu quia intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu; et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei, non autem sicut potentia potentiae.

As has been said above (Q77, A3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects, since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object:

Sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum, eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum:

With regard to its formal aspect, the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species.

De ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum.

It has also been said above (Q59, A4) that if any power by its formal aspect be directed to an object according to the common formal aspect of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common formal aspect of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white.

Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum: sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri.

Now, the intellect regards its object under the common formal aspect of being, since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality". Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of beings.

Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis, eo quod intellectus possibilis est "quo est omnia fieri". Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis.

Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers.

Praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae, non autem potentiarum intellectivarum.

Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect, because as regards the same object, the active power which [formally] makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is [formally] moved by the object existing in act.

Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.

Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.

Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia; potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu.

Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect, for it belongs to the formal aspect of its passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.

Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent."

Quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires, tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod "si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit."

Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers: but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis: sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus; voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.