No. The soul alone is not the subject of all the powers because the subject of operative power is that which is able to operate (for every accident denominates its proper subject).
Non sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum quia illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari (omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum).
All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.
Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit.
The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject.
Philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod "sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti". Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto.
Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia.
Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia.
Some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers which are the principles of these operations are in the soul as their subject.
Quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto.
But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of such operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.
Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.
Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now, in many things relating to philosophy, Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.
Opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando: Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus.
When it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways.
Hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi.
Firstly, the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ.
Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico "cum corpore vel sine corpore", determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale.
Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.
Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.
All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.
Omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.
