Yes. There are five genera of powers of the soul because the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects.
Quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt, quia genera potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum obiecta.
But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner.
Obiectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae obiectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum, non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi suo obiecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari.
First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers --namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less common object--the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common object--universal being.
Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale.
Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one--the "appetitive"--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other--the "locomotive" power--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.
Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal movetur.
The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).
Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt, in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum; sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt, quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum; ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam, et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt, in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium, quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in II libro de anima.
The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual."
Philosophus dicit, in II de anima, "potentias autem dicimus vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum."
Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living.
Tres vero dicuntur animae. Quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi.
