1a 2ae q9 a5: Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body? No.

Impossibile est quod corpus caeleste imprimat directe in intellectum aut voluntatem quia res incorporeae et immateriales sunt formalioris et universalioris virtutis quam quaecumque res corporales.

It is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.

Voluntas enim, ut dicitur in III de anima, est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia animae non alligata organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino immaterialis et incorporea.

For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse.

Et propter hoc Aristoteles, in libro de anima, opinionem dicentium quod talis est voluntas in hominibus, "qualem in diem ducit pater deorum virorumque" (scilicet Iupiter, per quem totum caelum intelligunt), attribuit eis qui ponebant intellectum non differre a sensu. Omnes enim vires sensitivae, cum sint actus organorum corporalium, per accidens moveri possunt a caelestibus corporibus, motis scilicet corporibus quorum sunt actus.

For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [Odyssey xviii. 135 (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.

Appetitus intellectivus quodammodo movetur ab appetitu sensitivo; indirecte redundat motus caelestium corporum in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet per passiones appetitus sensitivi voluntatem moveri contingit.

The intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite; the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will, insofar as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Motus corporales humani reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in causam:

• inquantum ipsa dispositio organorum congrua ad motum, est aliqualiter ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et inquantum etiam appetitus sensitivus commovetur ex impressione caelestium corporum;
  
• et ulterius inquantum corpora exteriora moventur secundum motum caelestium corporum, ex quorum occursu voluntas incipit aliquid velle vel non velle.

Sicut adveniente frigore incipit aliquis velle facere ignem. Sed ista motio voluntatis est ex parte obiecti exterius praesentati, non ex parte interioris instinctus.

The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body:

• insofar as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• also, insofar as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies;
  
• and again, insofar as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something.

For instance, when our body is chilled, we begin to wish to make a fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.

Appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporalis. Unde nihil prohibet ex impressione corporum caelestium aliquos esse habiles ad irascendum vel concupiscendum, vel aliquam huiusmodi passionem, sicut et ex complexione naturali. Plures autem hominum sequuntur passiones, quibus soli sapientes resistunt. Et ideo ut in pluribus verificantur ea quae praenuntiantur de actibus hominum secundum considerationem caelestium corporum. Sed tamen, ut Ptolomaeus dicit in Centiloquio, "sapiens dominatur astris".

The sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars".

1a 2ae q9 a4: Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle? Yes.

Voluntas potest ab aliquo exteriori moveri quia indiget moveri ab alio sicut a primo movente.

The will can be moved by something exterior because it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

De ratione voluntarii est quod principium eius sit intra, sed non oportet quod hoc principium intrinsecum sit primum principium non motum ab alio. Unde motus voluntarius etsi habeat principium proximum intrinsecum, tamen principium primum est ab extra.

The formal aspect of the voluntary act is that its principle be within the agent, but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without.

Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it.

Hoc autem non est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam capitulo Ethicae Eudemicae.

But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).

1a 2ae q9 a3: Whether the will moves itself? Yes.

Voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quia inquantum actu vult finem, reducit se de potentia in actum respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut scilicet actu ea velit.

The will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means, because inasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.

Potentia voluntatis semper actu est sibi praesens, sed actus voluntatis, quo vult finem aliquem, non semper est in ipsa voluntate. Per hunc autem movet seipsam.

The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.

Voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti, a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.

The will is moved by the intellect, and also by itself. By the intellect it is moved by the formal aspect of the object; whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, by the formal aspect of the end.

Sicut supra dictum est, ad voluntatem pertinet movere alias potentias ex ratione finis, qui est voluntatis obiectum. Sed sicut dictum est, hoc modo se habet finis in appetibilibus, sicut principium in intelligibilibus.

As stated above (q9 a1), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by the formal aspect of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (q8 a2), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible.

Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum. Et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem.

But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions, and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

1a 2ae q9 a2: Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Yes.

Appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem quia secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti.

The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.

Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.

That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.

Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."

Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."

It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."

1a 2ae q9 a1: Whether the will is moved by the intellect? Yes.

Intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum, quia primum principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus.

The intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it, because the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.

Voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus, quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universali bono ut quoddam bonum particulare. Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri.

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal aspect of the true.

Sicut imaginatio formae sine aestimatione convenientis vel nocivi, non movet appetitum sensitivum; ita nec apprehensio veri sine ratione boni et appetibilis. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet, sed intellectus practicus, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).

Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus.

A power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo ex hac parte voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus, utimur enim aliis potentiis cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona, semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus; sicut dux exercitus, qui intendit bonum commune, scilicet ordinem totius exercitus, movet suo imperio aliquem ex tribunis, qui intendit ordinem unius aciei.

Good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

Sed obiectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified.

1a 2ae q9: That which moves the will

1. Is the will moved by the intellect?
2. Is it moved by the sensitive appetite?
3. Does the will move itself?
4. Is it moved by an extrinsic principle?
5. Is it moved by a heavenly body?
6. Is the will moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?

1a 2ae q8 a3: Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means? No.

Non eodem actu voluntas fertur in utrumque quia diversae species boni sunt finis, et id quod est ad finem, quod dicitur utile, et actus diversificantur secundum obiecta.

The will is not moved to both by the same act because the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good, and acts are diversified according to their objects.

Sic ergo voluntas in ipsum finem dupliciter fertur, uno modo, absolute secundum se; alio modo, sicut in rationem volendi ea quae sunt ad finem.

Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the formal aspect for willing the means.

Manifestum est ergo quod unus et idem motus voluntatis est quo fertur in finem, secundum quod est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et in ipsa quae sunt ad finem. Sed alius actus est quod fertur in ipsum finem absolute.

Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the formal aspect for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely.

Et quandoque praecedit tempore, sicut cum aliquis primo vult sanitatem, et postea, deliberans quomodo possit sanari, vult conducere medicum ut sanetur.

And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him.

1a 2ae q8 a2: Whether volition is of the end only? No, it is also of the means.

Si voluntas est finis, ipsa etiam est eorum quae sunt ad finem, quia ratio boni, quod est obiectum potentiae voluntatis, invenitur non solum in fine, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem.

If volition is of the end, it is also of the means, because the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

Voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus. Si ergo loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat potentiam, sic se extendit et ad finem, et ad ea quae sunt ad finem.

The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means.

Ad ea enim se extendit unaquaeque potentia, in quibus inveniri potest quocumque modo ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus se extendit ad omnia quaecumque participant quocumque modo colorem.

For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored.

Si autem loquamur de voluntate secundum quod nominat proprie actum, sic, proprie loquendo, est finis tantum. Omnis enim actus denominatus a potentia, nominat simplicem actum illius potentiae, sicut intelligere nominat simplicem actum intellectus.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the understanding.

Ea vero quae sunt ad finem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordine ad finem. Unde voluntas in ea non fertur, nisi quatenus fertur in finem, unde hoc ipsum quod in eis vult, est finis.

On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end.

Sicut et intelligere proprie est eorum quae secundum se cognoscuntur, scilicet principiorum, eorum autem quae cognoscuntur per principia, non dicitur esse intelligentia, nisi inquantum in eis ipsa principia considerantur.

Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.

1a 2ae q8 a1: Whether the will is of good only? Yes.

Omnis inclinatio est in bonum quia omnis res, inquantum est ens et substantia, est quoddam bonum.

Every inclination is to something good because everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good.

Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.

And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire".

Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.

In order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended under the formal aspect of good.

Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod "finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum".

Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good".

Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est boni, ita noluntas est mali.

The shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.

Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "malum est praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt".

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."

Illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit.

That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in formal aspect, wherefore negations and privations are said to be "beings of formal aspect". In this way, too, future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, insofar as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the formal aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.

Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "carere malo habet rationem boni".

Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered according to the formal aspect of a good".

1a 2ae q8: The will, in regard to what it wills

1. Is the will of good only?
2. Is it of the end only, or also of the means?
3. If in any way it be of the means, is it moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?

1a 2ae q7 a4: Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"? Yes.

Principalissimae circumstantiae sunt cuius gratia agitur, et quid est quod agitur, quia actus proprie dicuntur humani, prout sunt voluntarii; sed voluntatis motivum et obiectum est finis.

The most important circumstances are "why it is done" and "what is done" because acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary; but the motive and object of the will is the end.

Finis, etsi non sit de substantia actus, est tamen causa actus principalissima, inquantum movet ad agendum. Unde et maxime actus moralis speciem habet ex fine.

Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.

Et ideo principalissima est omnium circumstantiarum illa quae attingit actum ex parte finis, scilicet cuius gratia, secundaria vero, quae attingit ipsam substantiam actus, idest quid fecit.

Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did."

Aliae vero circumstantiae sunt magis vel minus principales, secundum quod magis vel minus ad has appropinquant.

As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.

1a 2ae q7 a3: Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics? Yes.

Circumstantia dicitur quod, extra substantiam actus existens, aliquo modo attingit ipsum, quia considerandum est in actibus quis fecit, quibus auxiliis vel instrumentis fecerit, quid fecerit, ubi fecerit, cur fecerit, quomodo fecerit, et quando fecerit.

A circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it, because in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it.

Tullius, in sua rhetorica, assignat septem circumstantias, quae hoc versu continentur, "quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando".

Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: "who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when".

Sed Aristoteles, in III Ethic., addit aliam, scilicet circa quid, quae a Tullio comprehenditur sub quid.

But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what", which Tully includes in the circumstance "what".

Contingit autem hoc fieri tripliciter, uno modo, inquantum attingit ipsum actum; alio modo, inquantum attingit causam actus; tertio modo, inquantum attingit effectum.

Ipsum autem actum attingit, vel per modum mensurae, sicut tempus et locus;
vel per modum qualitatis actus, sicut modus agendi.

Ex parte autem effectus, ut cum consideratur quid aliquis fecerit.

Ex parte vero causae actus, quantum ad causam finalem, accipitur propter quid;
ex parte autem causae materialis, sive obiecti, accipitur circa quid;
ex parte vero causae agentis principalis, accipitur quis egerit;
ex parte vero causae agentis instrumentalis, accipitur quibus auxiliis.

Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect.

It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place";
or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."

It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done.

It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what";
as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who";
and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids",

1a 2ae q7 a2: Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts? Yes.

Consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii.

The theologian has to consider circumstances because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary.

Ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad theologum.

Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.

Accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent, relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum. Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.

Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents do not have the formal aspect of circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (q7 a1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.

Bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "in ad aliquid bonum est utile". In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro, aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.

Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

1a 2ae q7 a1: Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act? Yes.

Circumstantiae actuum humanorum accidentia eorum dicenda sunt quia quod est extra substantiam rei ad rem ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur.

The circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents because what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident.

Nomen circumstantiae ab his quae in loco sunt, derivatur ad actus humanos. Dicitur autem in localibus aliquid circumstare, quod est quidem extrinsecum a re, tamen attingit ipsam, vel appropinquat ei secundum locum. Et ideo quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur.

The word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts. Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.

Particulares conditiones cuiuslibet rei singularis dicuntur accidentia individuantia ipsam. Sed philosophus, in III Ethic., circumstantias nominat particularia, idest particulares singulorum actuum conditiones. Ergo circumstantiae sunt accidentia individualia humanorum actuum.

The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [ta kath' ekasta], i.e., the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.

1a 2ae q7: The circumstances of human acts

1. What is a circumstance?
2. Should a theologian take note of the circumstances of human acts?
3. How many circumstances are there?
4. Which are the most important of them?

1a 2ae q6 a8: Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? Yes.

Ignorantia habet causare involuntarium ea ratione qua privat cognitionem, quae praeexigitur ad voluntarium, ut supra dictum est, quia non quaelibet ignorantia huiusmodi cognitionem privat.

If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is insofar as its formal aspect deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above (q6 a1), because it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge.

Et ideo sciendum quod ignorantia tripliciter se habet ad actum voluntatis, uno modo, concomitanter; alio modo, consequenter; tertio modo, antecedenter.

Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."

Damascenus et philosophus dicunt, quod "involuntarium quoddam est per ignorantiam".

Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."

1a 2ae q6 a7: Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? No.

Concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis facit aliquid voluntarium, quia dicitur aliquid voluntarium ex eo quod voluntas in id fertur.

Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary, because a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it.

Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur.

Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.

Nam incontinens concupiscentiae agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc vult; sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se vult.

The man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.

1a 2ae q6 a6: Whether fear causes involuntariness simply? No.

Sic autem hoc quod fit per metum, est voluntarium, inquantum scilicet est hic et nunc, prout scilicet in hoc casu est impedimentum maioris mali quod timebatur, sicut proiectio mercium in mare fit voluntarium tempore tempestatis, propter timorem periculi. Unde manifestum est quod simpliciter voluntarium est. Unde et competit ei ratio voluntarii, quia principium eius est intra.

And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, insofar as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear has the formal aspect of the voluntary, because its principle is within.

Sed quod accipiatur id quod per metum fit, ut extra hunc casum existens, prout repugnat voluntati, hoc non est nisi secundum considerationem tantum. Et ideo est involuntarium secundum quid, idest prout consideratur extra hunc casum existens.

But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.

Sicut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., et idem dicit Gregorius Nyssenus in libro suo de homine, huiusmodi quae per metum aguntur, "mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario". Id enim quod per metum agitur, in se consideratum, non est voluntarium, sed fit voluntarium in casu, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timetur.

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

Sed si quis recte consideret, magis sunt huiusmodi voluntaria quam involuntaria, sunt enim voluntaria simpliciter, involuntaria autem secundum quid. Unumquodque enim simpliciter esse dicitur secundum quod est in actu, secundum autem quod est in sola apprehensione, non est simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect.

Patet ergo quod in eo quod per vim agitur, voluntas interior nihil agit, sed in eo quod per metum agitur, voluntas aliquid agit.

It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something.

1a 2ae q6 a5: Whether violence causes involuntariness? Yes.

Violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam et naturali, quia commune est voluntario et naturali quod utrumque sit a principio intrinseco, violentum autem est a principio extrinseco.

Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural, because the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle, whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle.

Quantum igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit.

As to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (q6 a4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.

Philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod "aliquid est involuntarium per violentiam".

The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."

1a 2ae q6 a4: Whether violence can be done to the will? No.

Voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum quia actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sed quod est coactum vel violentum, est ab exteriori principio; unde contra rationem ipsius actus voluntatis est, quod sit coactus vel violentus.

The will cannot be compelled to act because the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge, whereas what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle; consequently it is contrary to the formal aspect of the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence.

Duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur mediante potentia motiva.

The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.

Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, insofar as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.

Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, "cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud". Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis, nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem.

God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Proverbs 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.

1a 2ae q6 a3: Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? Yes.

Sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non velle, quia voluntas, volendo et agendo, potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei, quasi ab ipsa existens.

Just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will, because the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will.

Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu, quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut cum non vult.

And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.

Eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis, sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare.

Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.

1a 2ae q6 a2: Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals? Yes.

Soli rationali naturae competit voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, sed secundum rationem imperfectam, competit etiam brutis animalibus, quia imperfectam cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed subito movetur in ipsum.

The voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature, whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals because imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary, inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once.

Voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, et ideo non potest esse in his quae ratione carent. Voluntarium autem denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in finem.

The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word "voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae.

Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature.

Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et aestimationem naturalem.

But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.

1a 2ae q6 a1: Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? Yes.

Oportet in actibus humanis voluntarium esse quia quodcumque agit vel movetur a principio intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in seipso principium sui actus non solum ut agat, sed etiam ut agat propter finem.

There must needs be something voluntary in human acts because whatever acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end.

Hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non solum cuius principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae. Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.

The word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge." Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.

Deus movet hominem ad agendum non solum sicut proponens sensui appetibile, vel sicut immutans corpus, sed etiam sicut movens ipsam voluntatem; quia omnis motus tam voluntatis quam naturae, ab eo procedit sicut a primo movente. Et sicut non est contra rationem naturae quod motus naturae sit a Deo sicut a primo movente (inquantum natura est quoddam instrumentum Dei moventis), ita non est contra rationem actus voluntarii quod sit a Deo (inquantum voluntas a Deo movetur). Est tamen communiter de ratione naturalis et voluntarii motus, quod sint a principio intrinseco.

God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with the formal aspect of nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover (inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it), so it is not contrary to the formal aspect of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God (inasmuch as the will is moved by God). Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this formal aspect in common, that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.

Damascenus, in II libro, quod "voluntarium est actus qui est operatio rationalis".

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation."

1a 2ae q6: The voluntary and the involuntary

1. Is there anything voluntary in human acts?
2. In irrational animals?
3. Can there be voluntariness without any action?
4. Can violence be done to the will?
5. Does violence cause involuntariness?
6. Does fear cause involuntariness?
7. Does concupiscence cause involuntariness?
8. Does ignorance cause involuntariness?

1a 2ae q5 a8: Whether every man desires happiness? Yes.

Quilibet vult esse beatus quia appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur.

Everyone desires to be happy because to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied, and this everyone desires.

Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius, quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit.

For the general formal aspect of happiness consists in its being the perfect good, as has been said above. But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will.

1a 2ae q5 a7: Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God? Yes.

Per actionem ad beatitudinem pervenitur quia operatio hominis non praeexigitur ad consecutionem beatitudinis propter insufficientiam divinae virtutis beatificantis, sed ut servetur ordo in rebus.

Happiness is obtained through works because works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness, not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.

Ut enim dicitur in II de caelo, "eorum quae nata sunt habere bonum perfectum, aliquid habet ipsum sine motu, aliquid uno motu, aliquid pluribus". Habere autem perfectum bonum sine motu, convenit ei quod naturaliter habet illud. Habere autem beatitudinem naturaliter est solius Dei. Unde solius Dei proprium est quod ad beatitudinem non moveatur per aliquam operationem praecedentem.

For as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation.

Cum autem beatitudo excedat omnem naturam creatam, nulla pura creatura convenienter beatitudinem consequitur absque motu operationis, per quam tendit in ipsam. Sed Angelus, qui est superior ordine naturae quam homo, consecutus est eam, ex ordine divinae sapientiae, uno motu operationis meritoriae, ut in primo expositum est. Homines autem consequuntur ipsam multis motibus operationum, qui merita dicuntur. Unde etiam, secundum philosophum, beatitudo est praemium virtuosarum operationum.

Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in Ia q62 a5; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.

Apostolus dicit, Rom. IV, beatitudinem hominis esse cui Deus confert iustitiam sine operibus.

The Apostle says (Romans 4:6) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works."

Apostolus loquitur de beatitudine spei, quae habetur per gratiam iustificantem, quae quidem non datur propter opera praecedentia. Non enim habet rationem termini motus, ut beatitudo, sed magis est principium motus quo ad beatitudinem tenditur.

The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace does not have the formal aspect of a term of movement, as Happiness does; rather, it is the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.

1a 2ae q5 a6: Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature? No.

Non per actionem superioris creaturae, scilicet Angeli, in hominem, homo beatus efficitur, quia beatitudo est quoddam bonum excedens naturam creatam; unde impossibile est quod per actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur, sed homo beatus fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta.

Man is not made happy through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him, because Happiness is a good surpassing created nature; therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature, but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness.

Et ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci, et cetera huiusmodi.

Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like.

Plerumque contingit in potentiis activis ordinatis, quod perducere ad ultimum finem pertinet ad supremam potentiam, inferiores vero potentiae coadiuvant ad consecutionem illius ultimi finis disponendo, sicut ad artem gubernativam, quae praeest navifactivae, pertinet usus navis, propter quem navis ipsa fit.

It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made.

Sic igitur et in ordine universi, homo quidem adiuvatur ab Angelis ad consequendum ultimum finem, secundum aliqua praecedentia, quibus disponitur ad eius consecutionem; sed ipsum ultimum finem consequitur per ipsum primum agentem, qui est Deus.

Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto; whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is God.

Lumen autem gloriae, per quod Deus videtur, in Deo quidem est perfecte secundum esse naturale, in qualibet autem creatura est imperfecte, et secundum esse similitudinarium vel participatum. Unde nulla creatura beata potest communicare suam beatitudinem alteri.

The light of glory, whereby God is seen, exists in God perfectly, and naturally; whereas in any creature, it exists imperfectly, and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.

Angelus beatus illuminat intellectum hominis, vel etiam inferioris Angeli, quantum ad aliquas rationes divinorum operum, non autem quantum ad visionem divinae essentiae (ut in primo dictum est). Ad eam enim videndam, omnes immediate illuminantur a Deo.

The happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man, or of a lower angel, as to certain formal aspects of the Divine works, but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence (as was stated in Ia q106 a1), since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.

1a 2ae q5 a5: Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers? No.

Homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi, quia homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem, sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem.

Man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers because, by his intellect and will, man is naturally the principle of his action, but final Happiness prepared for the saints surpasses the intellect and will of man.

Sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi, hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. "Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus", ut dicitur in III Ethic.

Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it did not give him a definite principle by which he would attain Happiness, since this is impossible [because of what Happiness, by its nature, is]. But it did give him free choice, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy [by God's friendship with him]: "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).

Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est secundum modum substantiae eius; sicut de intelligentia dicitur in libro de causis, quod "cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae". Omnis autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.

The natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance; thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance." But every cognition that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by its natural powers.

Non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex obiecto.

For not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness, since operation takes its species from its object.

Nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de caelo.

The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12).

Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae, quam qui solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae naturae.

Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.

Beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest, potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur.

Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists; on this point we shall speak further on (q63).

1a 2ae q5 a4: Whether happiness once had can be lost? No.

Beatitudo non potest amitti quia requiritur ad veram beatitudinem quod homo certam habeat opinionem bonum quod habet, nunquam se amissurum, cum enim ipsa beatitudo sit perfectum bonum et sufficiens, oportet quod desiderium hominis quietet, et omne malum excludat.

Happiness cannot be lost because it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses, for since happiness is the "perfect and sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil.

Et quia beatitudo huius vitae amitti potest, quod videtur esse contra rationem beatitudinis; ideo philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., aliquos esse in hac vita beatos, non simpliciter, sed sicut homines quorum natura mutationi subiecta est.

Since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.

Perfecta beatitudo hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Est autem impossibile quod aliquis videns divinam essentiam, velit eam non videre. Quia omne bonum habitum quo quis carere vult, aut est insufficiens, et quaeritur aliquid sufficientius loco eius, aut habet aliquod incommodum annexum, propter quod in fastidium venit. Visio autem divinae essentiae replet animam omnibus bonis, cum coniungat fonti totius bonitatis.

Man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness.

Beatitudo est perfectio consummata, quae omnem defectum excludit a beato. Et ideo absque mutabilitate advenit eam habenti, faciente hoc virtute divina, quae hominem sublevat in participationem aeternitatis transcendentis omnem mutationem.

Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably; this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.

1a 2ae q5 a3: Whether one can be happy in this life? No.

Aliqualis beatitudinis participatio in hac vita haberi potest, perfecta autem et vera beatitudo non potest haberi in hac vita, quia beatitudo, cum sit "perfectum et sufficiens bonum", omne malum excludit, et omne desiderium implet, sed in hac vita non potest omne malum excludi.

A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life, but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life, because since happiness is a "perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire, but in this life every evil cannot be excluded.

Beati dicuntur aliqui in hac vita, vel propter spem beatitudinis adipiscendae in futura vita, secundum illud Rom. VIII, "spe salvi facti sumus".

Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Romans 8:24: "We are saved by hope".

Beatitudo consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae non potest homini provenire in hac vita, ut in primo ostensum est.

Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in Ia q12 a11.

1a 2ae q5 a2: Whether one man can be happier than another? Yes.

Sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis beatitudo, quia contingit aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem, et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse.

There are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all, because that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him, and in this sense one man can be happier than another.

Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est.

As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another, because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is.

1a 2ae q5 a1: Whether man can attain happiness? Yes.

Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci.

That man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain happiness.

Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est, in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus.

This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in Ia q12 a1, in which vision, as we stated above (q3 a8) man's perfect Happiness consists.

Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest.

Reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature, but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation, whereas man attains it after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.

1a 2ae q5: The attainment of happiness

1. Can man attain happiness?
2. Can one man be happier than another?
3. Can any man be happy in this life?
4. Once had, can happiness be lost?
5. Can man attain happiness by means of his natural powers?
6. Does man attain happiness through the action of some higher creature?
7. Are any actions of man necessary in order that man may obtain happiness of God?
8. Does every man desire happiness?

1a 2ae q4 a8: Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness? No.

Si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.

If we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness because man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God, since man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod "creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in Deo."

But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."

Perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.

Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.

Si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur; et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae.

If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.

1a 2ae q4 a7: Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness? No.

Nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur ad beatitudinem perfectam, quae in visione Dei consistit, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem; illa autem perfecta beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine corpore, vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed spirituali.

These external goods are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God, because they are ordained to the animal life, whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual.

Bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum.

These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.

Ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus exerceat opera activae virtutis.

For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations.

Secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam congruentiam et decorem.

According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.

Omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita consurgamus, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias, sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo.

All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.

1a 2ae q4 a6: Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Bona dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem quia cum naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat.

Good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness because since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui subiectum.

The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul, but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit.

Etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis.

Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

In corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem.

Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object, but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.

Si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, secundum philosophum, "in operatione virtutis perfectae". Manifestum est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione virtutis homo impediri potest.

If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.

1a 2ae q4 a5: Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness? No.

Sine corpore potest anima esse beata quia desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit.

Without the body, the soul can be happy, because the desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite.

Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive.

But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

1a 2ae q4 a4: Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et antecedenter et concomitanter: antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum; concomitanter autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis.

Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly: antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end; concomitantly, because as stated above (q3, a8), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness.

Nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis.

Nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will.

Omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi.

Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect, but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.

Non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius.

Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end, but only that which has the formal aspect of imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained, but the due order to the end is necessary.

Et ita voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta voluntate.

So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common formal aspect of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.

1a 2ae q4 a3: Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness? Yes.

Comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem quia ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex ipso ordine hominis ad finem.

Comprehension is necessary for Happiness because those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end.

Ad finem autem intelligibilem ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum, quae quidem potest esse triplex.

Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold.

Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem rei amantis in amato.

And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum.

Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision, but a certain relation to the end already gained.