Saturday, December 19, 2009

1a 2ae q9 a2: Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? Yes.

Appetitus sensitivus movet voluntatem quia secundum passionem appetitus sensitivi, immutatur homo ad aliquam dispositionem; unde secundum quod homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti.

The sensitive appetite moves the will because according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition; wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected.

Id quod apprehenditur sub ratione boni et convenientis, movet voluntatem per modum obiecti. Quod autem aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et eius cui proponitur. Conveniens enim secundum relationem dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependet.

That which is apprehended under the formal aspect of good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes.

Et inde est quod gustus diversimode dispositus, non eodem modo accipit aliquid ut conveniens et ut non conveniens. Unde, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei."

And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."

Sicut philosophus dicit in I Polit., ratio, in qua est voluntas, movet suo imperio irascibilem et concupiscibilem, non quidem despotico principatu, sicut movetur servus a domino; sed principatu regali seu politico, sicut liberi homines reguntur a gubernante, qui tamen possunt contra movere. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere ad voluntatem. Et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Dicitur Iac. I, "unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus."

It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."