Omnis inclinatio est in bonum quia omnis res, inquantum est ens et substantia, est quoddam bonum.
Every inclination is to something good because everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good.
Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.
And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire".
Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni.
In order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended under the formal aspect of good.
Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod "finis est bonum, vel apparens bonum".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good".
Fuga autem mali magis dicitur noluntas. Unde sicut voluntas est boni, ita noluntas est mali.
The shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "malum est praeter voluntatem, et quod omnia bonum appetunt".
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
Illud quod non est ens in rerum natura, accipitur ut ens in ratione, unde negationes et privationes dicuntur entia rationis. Per quem etiam modum futura, prout apprehenduntur, sunt entia. Inquantum igitur sunt huiusmodi entia, apprehenduntur sub ratione boni, et sic voluntas in ea tendit.
That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in formal aspect, wherefore negations and privations are said to be "beings of formal aspect". In this way, too, future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, insofar as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the formal aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them.
Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod "carere malo habet rationem boni".
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered according to the formal aspect of a good".