Homo per sua naturalia non potest beatitudinem consequi, quia homo est principium naturaliter actuum suorum per intellectum et voluntatem, sed ultima beatitudo sanctis praeparata excedit intellectum hominis et voluntatem.
Man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers because, by his intellect and will, man is naturally the principle of his action, but final Happiness prepared for the saints surpasses the intellect and will of man.
Sicut natura non deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non dederit sibi arma et tegumenta sicut aliis animalibus quia dedit ei rationem et manus, quibus possit haec sibi conquirere; ita nec deficit homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi, hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deum, qui eum faceret beatum. "Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus", ut dicitur in III Ethic.
Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it did not give him a definite principle by which he would attain Happiness, since this is impossible [because of what Happiness, by its nature, is]. But it did give him free choice, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy [by God's friendship with him]: "For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Naturalis enim cognitio cuiuslibet creaturae est secundum modum substantiae eius; sicut de intelligentia dicitur in libro de causis, quod "cognoscit ea quae sunt supra se, et ea quae sunt infra se, secundum modum substantiae suae". Omnis autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo, nec aliqua creatura, potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia.
The natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance; thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance." But every cognition that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by its natural powers.
Non enim quidquid potest causare dispositionem materiae, potest ultimam perfectionem conferre. Imperfecta autem operatio, quae subiacet naturali hominis potestati, non est eiusdem speciei cum operatione illa perfecta quae est hominis beatitudo, cum operationis species dependeat ex obiecto.
For not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness, since operation takes its species from its object.
Nobilioris conditionis est natura quae potest consequi perfectum bonum, licet indigeat exteriori auxilio ad hoc consequendum, quam natura quae non potest consequi perfectum bonum, sed consequitur quoddam bonum imperfectum, licet ad consecutionem eius non indigeat exteriori auxilio, ut philosophus dicit in II de caelo.
The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12).
Sicut melius est dispositus ad sanitatem qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem, licet hoc sit per auxilium medicinae, quam qui solum potest consequi quandam imperfectam sanitatem, sine medicinae auxilio. Et ideo creatura rationalis, quae potest consequi perfectum beatitudinis bonum, indigens ad hoc divino auxilio, est perfectior quam creatura irrationalis, quae huiusmodi boni non est capax, sed quoddam imperfectum bonum consequitur virtute suae naturae.
Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.
Beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest, potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus, in cuius operatione consistit, de quo infra dicetur.
Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists; on this point we shall speak further on (q63).