Audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae insequitur bonum, quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu.
Daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good, because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit.
Prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem.
Pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair.
Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum.
It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope, since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.
Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum.
But despair results from fear, since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes.
Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined, yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good.
Et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest.
In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect, just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Friday, July 30, 2010
1a 2ae q45 a1: Whether daring is contrary to fear? Yes.
Audacia est timori contraria quia illud quod maxime distat a timore, est audacia: timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum.
Daring is contrary to fear because that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger.
Uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria; sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio.
To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (q23 a2; q40 a4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope; the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
De ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.
It is of the formal aspect of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4.
Daring is contrary to fear because that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger.
Uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria; sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio.
To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (q23 a2; q40 a4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope; the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
De ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.
It is of the formal aspect of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a4: Whether fear hinders action? No.
Timor non impedit bonam operationem quia ex parte instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans, confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari.
Fear does not hinder a good action because on the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, but on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
Apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, "cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini", quod non diceret, si timor bonam operationem impediret.
The Apostle says (Philippians 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work.
Fear does not hinder a good action because on the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, but on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
Apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, "cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini", quod non diceret, si timor bonam operationem impediret.
The Apostle says (Philippians 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a3: Whether fear makes one tremble? Yes.
Tremor est effectus timoris quia in timore fit quaedam contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex debilitate virtutis continentis membra.
Trembling is an effect of fear because in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members.
Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod "terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium crepitus".
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth".
Trembling is an effect of fear because in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members.
Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod "terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium crepitus".
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth".
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a2: Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? Yes.
Homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari quia in difficilibus, maxime in quibus nobis non confidimus, consiliamur.
Men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid because it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel.
Sed ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.
But owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest.
The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel.
Si autem sit parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.
If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel".
Men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid because it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel.
Sed ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.
But owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest.
The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel.
Si autem sit parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.
If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel".
Monday, July 26, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a1: Whether fear causes contraction? Yes.
Quantum autem ad animalem motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est; quod autem aliquid difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra dictum est; virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se potest extendere: et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem, sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu.
As to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction, because fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q41 a2); but that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (q43 a2); and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends: wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite.
In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio.
In the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to—and the formal aspect of—the appetitive movement.
Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to systole," i.e. contraction.
Et inde est quod timentes mortem pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.
Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9).
As to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction, because fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q41 a2); but that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (q43 a2); and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends: wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite.
In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio.
In the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to—and the formal aspect of—the appetitive movement.
Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to systole," i.e. contraction.
Et inde est quod timentes mortem pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.
Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Saturday, July 24, 2010
1a 2ae q43 a2: Whether defect is the cause of fear? Yes.
Defectus, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, quia ex aliquo defectu virtutis contingit quod non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum.
Some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear, because it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil.
Some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear, because it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil.
Friday, July 23, 2010
1a 2ae q43 a1: Whether love is the cause of fear? Yes.
Amor est causa timoris quia omnis timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus: amor est causa eius per modum materialis dispositionis.
Love is the cause of fear because all fear is caused by our loving something: i.e., love causes fear by way of material disposition.
Obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis.
The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion.
Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum.
Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition according to which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris: ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Love is the cause of fear because all fear is caused by our loving something: i.e., love causes fear by way of material disposition.
Obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis.
The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion.
Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum.
Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition according to which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris: ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Thursday, July 22, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a6: Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy? Yes.
Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere remedium, vel non de facili, maxime redduntur timenda quia accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna.
Those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, inspire the greatest fear because they are considered as lasting forever or for a long time.
Obiectum timoris est malum; unde illud quod facit ad augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur.
The object of fear is evil; consequently, whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (q18 a3). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil, because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time.
Unde si pati aliquid in tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum.
Wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And according this argument, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. forever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "omnia timenda sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy".
Those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, inspire the greatest fear because they are considered as lasting forever or for a long time.
Obiectum timoris est malum; unde illud quod facit ad augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur.
The object of fear is evil; consequently, whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (q18 a3). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil, because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time.
Unde si pati aliquid in tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum.
Wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And according this argument, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. forever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "omnia timenda sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy".
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a5: Whether sudden things are especially feared? Yes.
Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., "timor insolita et repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum praecavet securitati," quia obiectum timoris est malum imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et repentinum.
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety," because the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes.
Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium in III de Tusculanis quaest., ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali.
First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.
Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.
Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, insofar as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.
Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger, wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, since it may be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger, wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety," because the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes.
Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium in III de Tusculanis quaest., ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali.
First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.
Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.
Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, insofar as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.
Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger, wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, since it may be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger, wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a4: Whether fear itself can be feared? Yes.
Potest aliquis timere timorem (ne scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam alicuius excellentis mali), quia provenit ex causa extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam imminentis mali.
It is possible for fear to be the object of fear (i.e., a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil), because it is due to an extrinsic cause, insofar as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil.
Illud solum habet rationem terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit; non autem quod provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati.
Nothing has the formal aspect of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will.
Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi: unde homo potest timorem repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.
It is subject to the will, insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason: wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
It is possible for fear to be the object of fear (i.e., a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil), because it is due to an extrinsic cause, insofar as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil.
Illud solum habet rationem terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit; non autem quod provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati.
Nothing has the formal aspect of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will.
Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi: unde homo potest timorem repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.
It is subject to the will, insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason: wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
Monday, July 19, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a3: Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? No.
Malum culpae proprie non habet rationem terribilis, quia malum culpae propriam causam habet voluntatem humanam.
The evil of sin, properly speaking, does not display the formal aspect of fear, because human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin.
Timor est de malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod habet causam extrinsecam.
The object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, does not have the formal aspect of fear, and that nothing gives rise to fear, save what is due to an external cause.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "non omnia mala timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow".
The evil of sin, properly speaking, does not display the formal aspect of fear, because human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin.
Timor est de malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod habet causam extrinsecam.
The object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, does not have the formal aspect of fear, and that nothing gives rise to fear, save what is due to an external cause.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "non omnia mala timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow".
Sunday, July 18, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a2: Whether an evil of nature is an object of fear? Yes.
De malo naturae potest esse timor quia sicut contristativum malum est quod contrariatur voluntati, ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur naturae: et hoc est malum naturae.
An evil of nature can be the object of fear because just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a destructive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature.
Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus.
But it must be observed that an evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause, and then it is called an evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus, illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem.
But sometimes an evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause, such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case, an evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.
Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans: hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., "quae valde longe sunt non timentur; sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur, sed quia non prope est, nihil curant".
Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "illi qui iam decapitantur non timent", videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed "ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis".
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur.
Consequently, an evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future. But if an evil of nature that is destructive be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
An evil of nature can be the object of fear because just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a destructive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature.
Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus.
But it must be observed that an evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause, and then it is called an evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus, illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem.
But sometimes an evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause, such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case, an evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.
Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans: hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., "quae valde longe sunt non timentur; sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur, sed quia non prope est, nihil curant".
Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "illi qui iam decapitantur non timent", videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed "ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis".
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur.
Consequently, an evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future. But if an evil of nature that is destructive be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a1: Whether the object of fear is good? No.
Primo et per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum, quia timor fugam quandam importat: quicumque autem importat fugam, habet malum pro obiecto.
In the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object, because fear implies an avoidance: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object.
Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni.
It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.
Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum.
Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing, save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for".
Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius: inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love.
In the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object, because fear implies an avoidance: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object.
Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni.
It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.
Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum.
Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing, save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for".
Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius: inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love.
Friday, July 16, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a4: Whether the six species of fear are suitably assigned? Yes.
Convenienter Damascenus assignet sex species timoris; scilicet, "segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam", quia illae species quae supra positae sunt, accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, et non secundum effectus et secundum quasdam speciales rationes.
Six species of fear are suitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety", because those species are derived from the diversity of objects, and not from the diversity of effects and certain specific formal aspects.
Sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus.
As stated above (q41 a2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things.
In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris.
In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature. And hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil.
Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia.
Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame."
Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis; cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio.
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three formal aspects. First by the aspect of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is "amazement."
Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis; quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione.
Secondly, by the aspect of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation. And then there is "stupor," which is caused by the imagination of something unwonted.
Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis quia scilicet provideri non potest: sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.
Thirdly, by the aspect of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
Six species of fear are suitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety", because those species are derived from the diversity of objects, and not from the diversity of effects and certain specific formal aspects.
Sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus.
As stated above (q41 a2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things.
In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris.
In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature. And hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil.
Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia.
Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame."
Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis; cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio.
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three formal aspects. First by the aspect of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is "amazement."
Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis; quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione.
Secondly, by the aspect of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation. And then there is "stupor," which is caused by the imagination of something unwonted.
Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis quia scilicet provideri non potest: sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.
Thirdly, by the aspect of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
Thursday, July 15, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a3: Whether there is a natural fear? No.
Timor non est naturalis quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra rationem inclinationis naturalis: puta quod timor refugit impugnationem mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis.
There is no natural fear because suchlike movements are contrary to the formal aspect of natural inclination: fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil, contrary to the inclination of nature.
There is no natural fear because suchlike movements are contrary to the formal aspect of natural inclination: fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil, contrary to the inclination of nature.
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