tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-216452702024-03-13T21:27:10.700-07:00Thomas Aquinas Study Circle"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his <i>Summa Theologiae</i> appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, <i>God in Himself</i> (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comBlogger1098125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-6059035630774860422017-11-13T07:52:00.000-08:002017-11-13T07:52:55.857-08:00Next meeting on January 19, 2018: Eleonore Stump at TWU<a href="http://morec.com/aquinas/"><img src="http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0415378982.01.LZZZZZZZ.jpg" height=350 /><img src="http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0199659303.01.LZZZZZZZ.jpg" height=350 /></a>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-39672873206276717112016-03-06T07:59:00.000-08:002016-03-06T07:59:07.716-08:00Next meeting on March 19, 2016: What are Human Rights?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT6UUl_t4mJzahyphenhyphenqSJ_8ZB3vJCQOf58gaAMZE03WUor39fUfuR1wj3hBKf0hzl13jSvi46qYru3L_bi9c3VgPK4Snq_GRNRmtFaQRg0N0esyKMjXH2bC5cG8NSwH04Gj4exQyH/s1600/hr.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT6UUl_t4mJzahyphenhyphenqSJ_8ZB3vJCQOf58gaAMZE03WUor39fUfuR1wj3hBKf0hzl13jSvi46qYru3L_bi9c3VgPK4Snq_GRNRmtFaQRg0N0esyKMjXH2bC5cG8NSwH04Gj4exQyH/s640/hr.jpg" width="494" /></a></div>
<br />Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-45557937819172415532015-10-17T09:03:00.004-07:002015-10-17T09:05:09.480-07:00Next meeting: Saturday, October 24, at 2pm at SCK, Mission, BC<a href="http://www.bccatholic.ca/opinion-and-editorial/5629-the-eyes-of-a-child-unlock-the-logic-of-wonderland"><img src="http://morec.com/aquinas/tasc-2015.jpg" width="550" /></a>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-37202498423391552762015-02-20T13:04:00.003-08:002015-02-20T13:04:46.874-08:00Next meeting of the Thomas Aquinas Study Circle on March 7, 2015<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjM7tn7i8mscDu0ffIdlv3KI4-mXeF_Xh_O1FneQA0fmTTPFCwLYRwqnBe3UWzhf_yQD53OFm8FNjc8_XynnxcDF6SeHVa5I-Ha5EP2fv-SknjDtg5C16a15pviroPDh4fqQYNB/s1600/TASC-2015-Poster.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjM7tn7i8mscDu0ffIdlv3KI4-mXeF_Xh_O1FneQA0fmTTPFCwLYRwqnBe3UWzhf_yQD53OFm8FNjc8_XynnxcDF6SeHVa5I-Ha5EP2fv-SknjDtg5C16a15pviroPDh4fqQYNB/s1600/TASC-2015-Poster.jpg" height="640" width="494" /></a></div>
<br />Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-58661638366813433462014-10-14T14:12:00.001-07:002014-10-14T14:14:27.797-07:00Next meeting: Nov 8, 2014<img src="https://registrar.corpuschristi.ca/media/avatars/Sr__Le.jpg" />
<img src="http://www.ewtnnewsonline.com/images/Pope_Francis_Credit_Lauren_Cater_CNA_EWTN_3_12_14.jpg" /><br />
<br />
Sr. Anne Frances Ai Le, OP, PhD, will speak on<br />
<br />
“<b>Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty and Christian Perfection</b>,”<br />
<br />
at <b>Corpus Christi College</b> on Saturday, <b>November 8</b>,<br />
<br />
from <b>10 a.m. to noon</b>, for the <a href="http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/nb09.htm#cercle"><i>Thomas Aquinas Study Circle</i></a>.<br />
<br />
Read more at <a href="http://www.bccatholic.ca/opinion-and-editorial/4311-pope-francis-says-vanity-is-layered-like-an-onion"><i>The B.C. Catholic</i> Web site</a>.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-26391274011598716362014-02-15T19:07:00.002-08:002017-11-13T08:06:00.827-08:00Next meeting: March 1, 2014<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-size: large;"><b>Thomas Aquinas Study Circle </b></span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>A Living Thomism for the Third Millennium </i></div>
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<br /></div>
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The <b>Thomas Aquinas Study Circle</b> (TASC) meets
three times a year:<b> </b><br />
i.e., once every academic semester.<br />
<br />
The TASC <a href="http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/nb09.htm#cercle">Statutes</a> were written by <b>Jacques Maritain</b>. </div>
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<br /></div>
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Our <b>SPRING 2014 </b>seminar topic is: </div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-large;"><b>What Is Justice? </b></span></div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Saturday, March 1, 2014, 10 a.m. </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Meet at Faculty Room, Saint Mark’s/Corpus Christi College, <br />
5935 Iona Drive, Vancouver </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i>FREE ADMISSION – ALL WELCOME</i> </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Dr. David Klassen</b>, Corpus Christi College </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
"Justice as Love:
Greek and Christian Origins of <br />
Aquinas’s Conception of Justice and Its Relevance in Late Modernity"</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><A HREF="http://www.bccatholic.ca/opinion-and-editorial/3549-culture-needs-faith-and-reason-based-law-schools">Dr. C.S. Morrissey</A></b>, Redeemer Pacific College </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
"Is Natural Justice Changeable?
<br />
Considerations from Aristotle, Aquinas, and Anglo-American Democracy"</div>
<p align=center><A HREF="http://bit.ly/1foKq9q ">PRESS COVERAGE</A>: “<A HREF="https://web.archive.org/web/20160112013445/http://www.bccatholic.ca/the-news/3570-what-is-justice">What is Justice?</A>”</p>
<br /><br /><div align="center">
<a href="http://morec.com/bcc/law.pdf"><img src="http://static.tumblr.com/d578aabc46ab7148663b9e7bb7287673/a5zijzd/dHpn6amci/tumblr_static_9hnv3tqrmacckcwoo8kwsgw44.png" width="500" /></a></div>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-64771534605799561472012-10-24T16:41:00.000-07:002012-10-24T16:41:09.020-07:00Thomas Aquinas Study CircleAbout our meeting this semester:<br />
<br />
<a href="http://busycatholic.blogspot.ca/2012/10/corpus-christi-college-calling-all-women.html">http://busycatholic.blogspot.ca/2012/10/corpus-christi-college-calling-all-women.html</a>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-86024015558426112252011-06-19T07:53:00.003-07:002011-07-04T05:07:58.425-07:001a 2ae q62 a2: Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Yes.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36110">Virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus</a> quia habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article2">The theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues</a> because habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus</span>, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself</span>, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas.</span> Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity.</span> When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum<span style="font-weight: bold;"> ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio</span>, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est.<br /><br /></span>If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, insofar as <span style="font-weight: bold;">each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions</span>; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (q27, a4; q28, a6, ad 2; q41, a2, ad 1).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod <span style="font-weight: bold;">omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant</span>, ut infra patebit.</span><br /><br />If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that<span style="font-weight: bold;"> all other virtues depend on charity in some way</span>, as we shall show further on (q65, a2,a5; II-II, q23, a7).Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-87705261004650915582011-05-15T14:55:00.004-07:002011-05-16T05:06:34.212-07:001a 2ae q62 a1: Whether there are any theological virtues? Yes.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36102">Fides, spes et caritas sunt theologicae virtutes in Deum ordinantes</a> quia oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. </span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article1">Faith, hope, and charity are theological virtues directing us to God</a> because it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae: tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia <span style="font-weight: bold;">sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur</span>.</span><br /><br />Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God; secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; thirdly, because <span style="font-weight: bold;">these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur, prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, <span style="font-weight: bold;">ratio et voluntas, secundum suam naturam, non ordinantur sufficienter</span>.</span><br /><br />The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But <span style="font-weight: bold;">the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed</span> to Him insofar as He is the object of supernatural happiness.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-86904707459545186442011-05-15T14:53:00.000-07:002011-05-15T14:54:22.471-07:001a 2ae q62: The theological virtues<ol><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article1"> Are there any theological virtues?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article2"> Are the theological virtues distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article3"> How many, and which are they?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2062.htm#article4"> Their order</a> </li></ol>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-14322005913050322082011-05-08T09:18:00.002-07:002011-05-08T09:58:03.471-07:001a 2ae q61 a5: Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues? Yes.<span style="font-style: italic;">Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36092">quatuor sunt</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, inquit, </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36092">quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primae <span style="font-weight: bold;">politicae</span> vocantur; secundae, <span style="font-weight: bold;">purgatoriae</span>; tertiae autem, <span style="font-weight: bold;">iam purgati animi</span>; quartae, <span style="font-weight: bold;">exemplares</span></a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia <span style="font-weight: bold;">deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est; alias est virtuosum</span>. </span><br /><br />"Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article5">'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: in the first place there are <span style="font-weight: bold;">social</span> virtues; secondly, there are <span style="font-weight: bold;">cleansing</span> virtues; thirdly, there are "<span style="font-weight: bold;">clean soul</span>" virtues; and fourthly, there are <span style="font-weight: bold;">exemplar</span> virtues.'</a>," because <span style="font-weight: bold;">to neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., oportet quod "anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus." Oportet igitur quod <span style="font-weight: bold;">exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat</span>, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes <span style="font-weight: bold;">exemplares</span>. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudentia</span>; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperantia</span> vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitudo</span> autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; <span style="font-weight: bold;">iustitia</span> vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. </span><br /><br />As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently <span style="font-weight: bold;">the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God</span>, just as in Him pre-exist the formal aspects of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing foremost in God, and thus we speak of "<span style="font-weight: bold;">exemplar</span>" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudence</span>; while <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperance</span> is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitude</span> is His unchangeableness; His <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice</span> is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Et quia <span style="font-weight: bold;">homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum</span>, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, <span style="font-weight: bold;">politicae</span> vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus. </span><br /><br />Again, since <span style="font-weight: bold;">man by his nature is a social animal</span>, these virtues, insofar as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "<span style="font-weight: bold;">social</span>" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, "estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est", <span style="font-weight: bold;">necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae</span>. </span><br /><br />But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), <span style="font-weight: bold;">we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes <span style="font-weight: bold;">purgatoriae</span>. Ita scilicet quod <span style="font-weight: bold;"> prudentia</span> omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperantia</span> vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitudinis</span> autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna;<span style="font-weight: bold;"> iustitia </span>vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam. </span><br /><br />Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine likeness; and these are called "<span style="font-weight: bold;">cleansing</span>" virtues. Thus <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudence</span>, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperance</span>, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitude</span> prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice</span> consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur <span style="font-weight: bold;">virtutes iam purgati animi</span>. Ita scilicet quod<span style="font-weight: bold;"> prudentia</span> sola divina intueatur; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperantia</span> terrenas cupiditates nesciat;<span style="font-weight: bold;"> fortitudo </span>passiones ignoret; <span style="font-weight: bold;">iustitia</span> cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.</span><br /><br />Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine likeness: these are called <span style="font-weight: bold;">the "clean soul virtues".</span> Thus<span style="font-weight: bold;"> prudence</span> sees nought else but the things of God; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperance</span> knows no earthly desires; <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitude</span> has no knowledge of passion; and <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice</span>, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-29097811721025375662011-04-24T08:13:00.002-07:002011-04-24T09:32:33.683-07:001a 2ae q61 a4: Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? Yes.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36083">Has quatuor virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> quia determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua <span style="font-weight: bold;">principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur</span>, ut supra dictum est:</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article4">These four [cardinal] virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects</a> because they have their special determinate matter; indeed, each of these [virtues] is determined to its [own] one [special] matter, in which <span style="font-weight: bold;">special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken</span>, as stated above (I-II, 61, 3; cf. II-II, 141, 2):<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">"istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Dicuntur tamen principales</span> respectu aliarum, <span style="font-weight: bold;">propter principalitatem materiae</span>: puta quod <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudentia</span> dicatur quae praeceptiva est; <span style="font-weight: bold;">iustitia</span>, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperantia</span>, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitudo</span>, quae firmat contra pericula mortis."</span><br /><br />"they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter. And thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Yet they are called principal [i.e., cardinal]</span> in comparison with the other virtues, <span style="font-weight: bold;">on account of the importance of their matter</span>: so that <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudence</span> is the virtue which commands; <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice</span>, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperance</span>, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitude</span>, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death."Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-87113261346271605952011-04-17T09:08:00.002-07:002011-04-17T09:17:55.903-07:001a 2ae q61 a3: Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these? No.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36077">Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias reducit</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> quia huiusmodi quatuor virtutes cardinales accipiuntur secundum <span style="font-weight: bold;">quatuor formales rationes virtutis</span> de qua loquimur.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article3">Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii)</a> because these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues in respect of <span style="font-weight: bold;">the four formal aspects of virtue</span> about which we now shall speak:<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Dicuntur <span style="font-weight: bold;">principales</span>, quasi <span style="font-weight: bold;">generales</span> ad omnes virtutes: utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudentia</span>; et quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur<span style="font-weight: bold;"> iustitia</span>; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperantia</span>; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitudo</span>.</span><br /><br />They are called <span style="font-weight: bold;">the principal formal aspects</span>, since they are <span style="font-weight: bold;">general</span>, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called <span style="font-weight: bold;">prudence</span>; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice</span>; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called <span style="font-weight: bold;">temperance</span>; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called <span style="font-weight: bold;">fortitude</span>.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-46081174518736557942011-04-03T09:41:00.003-07:002011-04-03T09:50:32.736-07:001a 2ae q61 a2: Whether there are four cardinal virtues? Yes.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36069">Prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia quadruplex invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet <span style="font-weight: bold;">rationale per essentiam</span>, quod prudentia perficit; et <span style="font-weight: bold;">rationale per participationem</span>, quod dividitur in tria; idest <span style="font-weight: bold;">in voluntatem</span>, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et <span style="font-weight: bold;">in concupiscibilem</span>, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et <span style="font-weight: bold;">in irascibilem</span>, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article2">Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply; the others are principal, each in its own genus</a>, because there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is <span style="font-weight: bold;">rational in its essence</span>, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is <span style="font-weight: bold;">rational by participation</span>, and is threefold: <span style="font-weight: bold;">the will</span>, subject of "Justice"; <span style="font-weight: bold;">the concupiscible faculty</span>, subject of "Temperance"; and <span style="font-weight: bold;">the irascible faculty</span>, subject of "Fortitude".<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur <span style="font-weight: bold;">quatuor cardinales virtutes</span>.</span><br /><br />Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are, and either way we find that there are <span style="font-weight: bold;">four cardinal virtues</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., "<span style="font-weight: bold;">in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit</span>".</span><br /><br />Gregory says (Moral. ii): "<span style="font-weight: bold;">The entire structure of a good work is built on four virtues</span>".Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-43023854026732813552011-03-27T10:07:00.003-07:002011-03-27T10:13:22.450-07:001a 2ae q61 a1: Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? Yes.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36061">Convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia perfectum est principalius imperfecto. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. </span></span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article1">Those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues</a> because the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: <span style="font-weight: bold;">and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut ex supradictis patet.</span><br /><br />Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (q57 a4).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, "beati pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem". Hae autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.</span><br /><br />Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-54913639339978602132011-03-27T10:03:00.002-07:002011-03-27T10:05:41.699-07:001a 2ae q61: The cardinal virtues<ol><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article1"> Should the moral virtues be called cardinal or principal virtues?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article2"> Their number</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article3"> Which are they?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article4"> Do they differ from one another?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2061.htm#article5"> Are they fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</a> </li></ol><a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0268001030/moreccommunin-20"><img src="http://images.amazon.com/images/P/0268001030.01.LZZZZZZZ.jpg" /></a>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-87911723808136421702011-03-20T09:32:00.003-07:002011-03-27T10:12:46.084-07:001a 2ae q60 a5: Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Yes.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36051">Secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, erunt omnes undecim</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article5">According to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all</a>, because all objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo.</span> Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.</span> Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum.</span><br /><br />Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-23628977081931048092011-03-13T14:52:00.002-07:002011-03-13T21:05:10.275-07:001a 2ae q60 a4: Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Yes.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36042">Non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis</a>, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae ad concupiscibilem.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article4">It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions</a>, because some passions are not in the same power as other passions, since some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas.</span><br /><br />On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-20665115352080634472011-03-06T07:10:00.002-08:002011-03-06T07:29:31.733-08:001a 2ae q60 a3: Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations? No.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36034">Omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, <span style="font-weight: bold;">conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae</span>, quae attenditur secundum <span style="font-weight: bold;">debitum ad alterum</span>, distinguuntur autem secundum <span style="font-weight: bold;">diversas speciales rationes</span></a>, quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum <span style="font-weight: bold;">ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa</span>.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article3">All the moral virtues that are about operations <span style="font-weight: bold;">fit with one general, formal aspect of justice</span>, which is in respect of <span style="font-weight: bold;">something due to another</span>, but they differ in respect of <span style="font-weight: bold;">various specific formal aspects</span></a>, because in external operations, the order of formal aspect is established, as we have stated (q60 a2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to <span style="font-weight: bold;">the fittingness itself of the thing itself</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae; <span style="font-weight: bold;">ad iustitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat</span>. </span><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Unde omnes huiusmodi virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem iustitiae</span>. </span><br /><br />From that fittingness we derive the formal aspect of something due, which is the formal aspect of justice; for <span style="font-weight: bold;">it seems to pertain to justice that a man give another his due</span>. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the formal aspect of justice</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Sed <span style="font-weight: bold;"> debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus</span>, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. </span><br /><br />But <span style="font-weight: bold;">the thing due is not of the same formal aspect in all these virtues</span>: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Et secundum has diversas <span style="font-weight: bold;">rationes debiti</span>, sumuntur diversae virtutes: puta <span style="font-weight: bold;">religio</span> est per quam redditur debitum Deo; <span style="font-weight: bold;">pietas</span> est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; <span style="font-weight: bold;">gratia</span> est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.</span><br /><br />And corresponding to these various [specific] <span style="font-weight: bold;">formal aspects of debt</span> there are various virtues: e.g. "<span style="font-weight: bold;">Religion</span>", whereby we pay our debt to God; "<span style="font-weight: bold;">Piety</span>", whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "<span style="font-weight: bold;">Gratitude</span>", whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-89901519007857190752011-02-10T06:57:00.002-08:002011-02-10T07:11:13.832-08:001a 2ae q60 a2: Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions? Yes.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36028">In quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem</a>, quia potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article2">In some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions</a>, because operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Cuius ratio est, quia <span style="font-weight: bold;">bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas</span>, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas: inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum <span style="font-weight: bold;">rationem commensurationis ad alterum</span>. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas: sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur <span style="font-weight: bold;">ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum</span>.</span><br /><br />The reason for this is that <span style="font-weight: bold;">good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations</span>, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. insofar as good and evil in them depend on <span style="font-weight: bold;">the formal aspect of their being in due measure with someone else</span>. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is <span style="font-weight: bold;">a formal aspect of something due or undue to another</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. <span style="font-weight: bold;">In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem</span>. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur <span style="font-weight: bold;">animae passiones</span>, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi. </span><br /><br />For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, <span style="font-weight: bold;">in some operations, good and evil depend only on due measure with the agent</span>. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called <span style="font-weight: bold;">the passions of the soul</span>, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, <span style="font-weight: bold;">praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem</span>. Et tunc, inquantum <span style="font-weight: bold;">corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis</span>, est corruptio iustitiae; inquantum autem <span style="font-weight: bold;">corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum</span>, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis.</span><br /><br />It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that <span style="font-weight: bold;">the good of virtue is overlooked on account of some inordinate passion of the soul</span>. In such cases justice is destroyed inasmuch as <span style="font-weight: bold;">the due measure of the external act is destroyed</span>; while some other virtue is destroyed inasmuch as <span style="font-weight: bold;">the internal passions exceed their due measure</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, <span style="font-weight: bold;">in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia; in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo</span>. Et idem patet in aliis.</span><br /><br />Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, <span style="font-weight: bold;">justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger</span>. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.</span><br /><br />The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-68892496261393081942011-02-06T06:50:00.003-08:002011-02-06T07:08:55.125-08:001a 2ae q60 a1: Whether there is only one moral virtue? No.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36020">Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus</span><span style="font-style: italic;">, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article1">Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only</a>, because <span style="font-weight: bold;">objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species</span>, according to their various relations to reason.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem <span style="font-weight: bold;">appetitus</span> recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia <span style="font-weight: bold;">non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem</span>, ut dicitur in I Ethic.</span><br /><br />Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But <span style="font-weight: bold;">the appetite</span> does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it <span style="font-weight: bold;">is rational, not essentially, but by participation</span> (Ethic. i, 13).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.</span></span><br /><br />As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). <span style="font-weight: bold;">Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Obiectum rationis est verum. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia.</span> Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. </span><br /><br />The object of the reason is truth. <span style="font-weight: bold;">Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth.</span> Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est <span style="font-weight: bold;">bonum appetibile</span>. Cuius est diversa ratio, <span style="font-weight: bold;">secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem</span> dirigentem.</span><br /><br />On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is <span style="font-weight: bold;">the appetible good</span>, which varies in formal aspect <span style="font-weight: bold;">according to its various relations to reason</span>, the directing formal aspect.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis</span>, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends</span>, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-27029251801428329832011-02-06T06:47:00.001-08:002011-02-06T06:47:33.690-08:001a 2ae q60: How the moral virtues differ from one another<ol><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article1"> Is there only one moral virtue?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article2"> Are those moral virtues which are about operations, distinct from those which are about passions?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article3"> Is there but one moral virtue about operations?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article4"> Are there different moral virtues about different passions?</a> </li><li><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2060.htm#article5"> Do the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</a> </li></ol>Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-31839544194006195262011-02-05T09:39:00.003-08:002011-02-05T09:57:54.646-08:001a 2ae q59 a5: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? No.<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36011">Quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat</a>, quia fiet redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2059.htm#article5">The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion</a>, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt. </span><br /><br />If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.</span><br /><br />The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">"<span style="font-weight: bold;">Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione</span>", ut dicitur in I Ethic.</span><br /><br />"<span style="font-weight: bold;">No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice</span>", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.</span><br /><br />It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.</span><br /><br />Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-44458634562802056732011-01-28T08:20:00.002-08:002011-01-28T08:30:12.669-08:001a 2ae q59 a4: Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions? No.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#36003">Non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes</a><span style="font-style: italic;">, quia circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2059.htm#article4">Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations</a>, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.</span><br /><br />Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic; font-weight: bold;">Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.</span><br /><br />Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-21645270.post-55776274842675578502011-01-26T07:34:00.002-08:002011-01-26T07:46:34.503-08:001a 2ae q59 a3: Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? Yes.<a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2055.html#35995">Tristitia potest esse cum virtute</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> quia ad virtutem pertinet <span style="font-weight: bold;">quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est</span>, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic.</span><br /><br /><a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2059.htm#article3">Sorrow is compatible with virtue</a> because <span style="font-weight: bold;">moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful</span> is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (<span style="font-style: italic;">Ethic</span>. ii, 6,7).<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita <span style="font-weight: bold;">mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur</span>.</span><br /><br />Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is <span style="font-weight: bold;">evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow</span>.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.</span><br /><br />Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.</span><br /><br />Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, <span style="font-weight: bold;">secundum statum praesentis vitae</span>.</span><br /><br />Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, <span style="font-weight: bold;">in the present state of life</span>, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">In beatis</span>, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, <span style="font-weight: bold;">tristitia locum non habet</span>.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">There is no room for sorrow in the blessed</span>, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.Christopherushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17663000589853331760noreply@blogger.com