Yes. Science is in the intellect because through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.
Scientia est in intellectu quia anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.
If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.
Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.
Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.
Omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.
Even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness.
Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine.
In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold.
Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro.
So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver.
Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis.