No. Choice and will -- that is, the act of willing -- are different acts, yet they belong to the same power, because in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end.
Electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, quia in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur.
To "will" implies the simple appetite for something, wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself.
Velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur.
But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end.
Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free choice. But it has been shown above (Q79, A8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and free choice are not two powers, but one.
Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.
The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
Intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.