Yes. It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul because appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things.
Necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam quia appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus.
Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself.
Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu.
Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired, not as suitable to this or that power (such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing), but simply as suitable to the animal.
Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid, non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae (utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum), sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.
What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect, for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.
Id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile, appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.
To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.
Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge.
Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent.
For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being: that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.
In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur.
But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things; for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect, and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, "in quo omnia praeexistunt", sicut Dionysius dicit.
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.
Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.
And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.
Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.